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Event Extraordinary!
Bar Association Outing. Games!

Dinner!

Y

Camp Fire!

Mount Vernon Country Club.

Wednesday afternoon and evening, June 27, 1928.
Afternoon: games and contests of golf, tennis, horseshoes,
baseball, bridge, etc. Open to all members.
Dinner at 7:00 o'clock in the Club House.
Campfire after dark with singing, dialogue, and post
prandial entertainment of great interest and ingenuity.
Transportation will be provided for those who request it.

SAVE THIS DATE.
If you cannot-arrange to be there for the whole time, come
for as much of the time as you can.
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The Annual Meeting

ciation held April 30, 1928, in
HE
of the BuildAssothe annual
Chambermeeting
of Commerce
ing, was attended by about one hundred members and proved to be very
interesting.
President
Stearns presided
and
opened the meeting by giving a summary of the activities of the Association during the past year. He made
certain recommendations as to the future, as follows:
"1. The Legislative Committee has
made some studied and valuable recommendations. As they will go out
of office before the Legislature convenes, they will be unable to follow
through their work to completion. I
hope, however, their recommedations
may be the basis for constructive legislation and serve to correct some of the

evils into which the Legislature has
lately fallen.
2. The Grievance Committee of the
Association is but an investigating and
a recommending body. The Grievance
Committee of the State Association
has broader powers. We have had a
close liaison between the two committees this year.
Our chairman, Mr.
Rhoads, has been a member of the
state committee. He has been able to
accomplish a vast amount of work effectively by the contact between the
two committees and has avoided much
delay and duplication of labor.
3. In view of the frequent transfers
of lawyers to other localities, we are
often requested to give information
concerning the pendency of charges Involving unprofessional conduct. This
does not mean trivial and unfounded
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complaints of which any lawyer may
be the undeserving subject, but relates
to the more serious charges, a failure
to mention which might bring reproach upon our own organization. In
order to preserve this information, the
Grievance Committee should maintain
records which- may be handed on to
their successors.
4. The Denver Bar Association is
probably the largest organization of
lawyers between the Mississippi River
and the Pacific Coast. In view of its
position, contact should be made with
other bar associations in this vicinity.
At slight additional expense the mailing list of the Record could be enlarged
to include these other organizations.
Perhaps for a slight subscription
charge it could be supplied to their
various members.
5. The arrangement with the City
for the rental of the library is only
fair. I hope and believe it will be
possible to continue it.
6. Perplexing problems of conduct
involving questions of ethics frequently arise, particularly among the younger lawyers. They should be made to
feel free to obtain counsel from the
Committee on Legal Ethics. Perhaps
if the Ethics Committee were consulted
more frequently, the Grievance Committee would not be so overworked!
7. In his address before the Association at the last meeting, Judge
Steele pointed out certain defects in
the state laws relating to dependency,
delinquency and custody of children.
This matter should be referred to the
Committee on Laws relating to Women
and Children for recommendation and
action.
It should more properly be
taken up next year because the committee will then be able to present corrective measures to the Legislature.
8. The Bar Association has adopted
and should continue a policy strongly
in favor of the adoption of Amendment
No. 1 having to do with increases in
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judicial salaries. No thoughtful person can deny the need for this reform.
9. In the event a bar primary is
held for candidates for judicial office,
I strongly recommend that the matter
of conducting the primary be amended
to inform the public of the professional
qualifications of the candidates approved by the Bar. In indicating our
choices we should show the number of
lawyers voting and the number of
votes cast for each candidate. Failure
to advise the public of the number of
votes received by each candidate is
apt to give the public an erroneous
idea of the standing of the candidates.
Bar associations were originally
formed "for the purppse of maintaining the honor and integrity of the profession of the law and cultivating social relations among their members."
As time has gone on it has been made
apparent that voluntary associations of
like minded persons are capable of exercising a wholesome influence, not
only over their members but over the
community at large. This public responsibility is more and more recognized by associations of lawyers
throughout the country. In 1924, after
fifty-three years of useful work, the
Association of the Bar of the City of
New York amended its declaration of
purposes so as to read as follows:
"For the purposes of cultivating
the science of jurisprudence, promoting reforms in the law, facilitating the administration of justice, elevating the standard of integrity, honor and courtesy in the
legal profession, and cherishing
the spirit of brotherhood among
the members thereof."
The temptation is great, however, to
widen the sphere of activity to a point
that will weaken our prestige and our
influence.
The opportunity has frequently come during the past year to
resolve in favor of or against this or
that matter of public concern outside
the field of jurisprudence. It has been
the policy of the Association to decline

THE

DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

such opportunities. I am firmly convinced that if we limit our energies to
our own immediate field, we shall be
able to discharge them more creditably
and effectively and justify more fully
our existence."
The Denver Bar Association Record
for May containing the reports of Committees for the year were distributed
and in the hands of those present. The
Committee reports were then considered and approved.
In connection with the discussion of
the Court House Committee report,
Mr. Vogl inquired as to the location of
the Juvenile Court and was informed
that it was to be located on the fourth
floor and segregated from the rest of
the courts and administrative offices.
After some discussion, no action was
taken.
In connection with the Library Committee's report, a considerable discussion ensued as to the adoption of the
proposed amendment to Section 2 of
Article VI of the By-Laws, which
amendment read as follows:
ARTICLE VI.

Section 2. All funds which may be
received from the City and County of
Denver as rental of the library for the
use of judges and officials or for the
maintenance, equipment or operation
of the library, shall be expended by
the Treasurer solely for the maintenance, equipment or operation of the
library under the direction of the library committee; and the executive
committee shall from time to time set
aside such additional amounts out of
the funds of this association as may
be necessary for the proper maintenance, equipment and operation of said
library."
The amendment was finally adopted
by a considerable majority. It was explained that the purpose of this
amendment was to give elasticity to
the By-Laws so that the Executive
Committee might set aside for the use

RECORD

of the Library such funds as should be
necessary from time to time especially
if no money were received from the
City of Denver on account of the same.
The Judiciary Committee reported
orally in favor of a Bar Primary for
District, County and Juvenile Judges
to be elected at the fall election, and
in its report recommended the designation by the Association of one Democratic and one Republican candidate
for each office. Following a full and
extended discussion, the Bar Primary
Matter was by a substitute motion
deferred until a future meeting.
The Nominating Committee then
gave its report and on motion duly
seconded and carried, its nominees
were unanimously elected as follows:
For President
HENRY W. TOLL

For First Vice President
HUBERT L. SHATTUCK

For Second Vice President
PHip

HORNBEIN

For Trustees to July 1, 1931
CHARLES J. MUNZ and
HAMLET J. BARRY

These officers will take office July 1,
1928, and will serve for one year. Each
of the newly elected officers made a few
brief remarks following their election.
Following the above business, a most
delightful address was delivered by
W. W. Grant, Jr. His title "Musings
Without Method" was well chosen, but
could not have been designated, "Musings Without Interest," for he held the
attention of his audience and was
greeted with frequent applause.
His theme was that this is a business age and that that characteristic
is stamped upon every phase of activity. In discussing the causes of this,
he said that in every age there is an
undercurrent of thought that influences opinions and convictions on
every possible subject, and the opinions that are formed are affected by
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this undercurrent of thought. In answering his own question as to what
is that undercurrent today, he said
that the theory before the time of the
Reformation was that every man's salvation depended upon divine grace,
whereas, since the time of the Reformation, the thought has been that
every man is self-dependent and by his
own efforts governs his destiny; that
man now believes in his own power
to lift himself by tugging at his own
boot-straps; that the tendency today is
to substitute man for God. The thought
now is not method but efficiency. Justice today has many admirers but few
friends. All of this he thought was
the effect of the tendency of the agethe effect of business upon every condition. Mr. Grant decried the fact that
the tendency of the age Is so largely
along business lines that no man is
great for scholarly attainments only.
The question is not as to a man's mental attainments but as to a man's financial success. Mr. Grant stated that he
could point to no man in Denver or in
the State who occupies a position of
prominence in the community because
of the possession of anything or any
quality except great wealth.
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mand that certain personal habits be
preserved.
ROGER BACON
Mr. Grant mentioned the four obstacles to the recognition of truth as defined by Roger Bacon, as follows:
1. Frail authority.
2. Custom.
3. Common opinion.
4. Affectation of wisdom which
is the justification of ignorancesaying what has been said before
in a louder voice.
Mr. Grant said that there is no individual judgment. What we have is a
collective judgment of groups. He said
that you see that reflected today in the
sanctity of property rights. He said it
ought to be accompanied by a tendency
toward the liberties of the individual
which were intended to have been protected by the Bill'of Rights.
PRESENT PROBLEM

SANCTITY OF LAW

Mr. Grant stated that the great problem of the United States today is the
reconciliation of liberty with Government. He said there is no freedom of
speech today in this country, such as
was contemplated in the Bill of Rights.
He said you cannot discuss things not
believed by the majority.

Mr. Grant inquired as to the meaning of the words, "Sanctity of Law"
He said originally the kings ruled by
divine right and so the phrase, "Sanctity of the Law" arose. He said that
today the divine right of kings is gone
and the situation is reversed. The only
sanctity that exists depends upon the
sentiment behind it.
Law as law
means nothing. If moral sanction is
behind law, then it is good; if there
is no moral sanction behind a law,
then it is a bad law. The term, "Sanctity of Law" is a term of imperialism.
When one invokes the term, "Sanctity
of the Law." as to private rights, there
is no moral Involved. The only question is one of interpretation. Never
yet was there a moral behind the de-

In this connection, he referred to
the Speakers Bureau Forum of Dartmouth, at which anybody could talk.
When certain alumni complained, the
President replied that if they could not
train their boys well enough to know
the truth from apparent falsity, then
they had better close the college. Mr.
Grant quoted Voltaire's statement to
the effect that he did not agree with
what his friend had said, but that he
would give his life for that friend's
right to say it. He stated that it was
only within the last two or three years
that a man could say in Denver that
he was opposed to the Volstead Act.
He said that as to the protection supposed to have been granted in the Bill

DARTMOUTH FORUM
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of Rights as to freedom from search
and seizure, the State of Colorado has
none of that.
He then referred to double jeopardy
and cited the instance of a country
farmer starting to town for a few days
of recreation, who was arrested at the
outskirts of the city with a small quantity of liquor in his possession and
though entirely sober was fined in the
Municipal, State, and Federal Courts.
Mr. Grant placed part of the blame upon the legislators who passed bad laws
and part of the blame upon the enforcement officials. He felt, however,
that the courts could have pulled the
teeth out of much bad legislation and
he felt that the courts had fallen into
a tendency to go further than necessary in enforcing bad legislation. As
an example of bad legislation, he mentioned the safety clutch clause on the
act of the last legislature with reference to the protection of columbines.
CONCLUSIONS

In concluding, Mr. Grant stated that
he believed the Bill of Rights today
embodies, as formerly, a set of privileges but that few people can rely upon
it for protection. He said that individual liberty has been limited to that
extent. He said that every Supreme
Court report lends color to this view,
and that the next great attack in this
country would be directed against the
courts. He felt that there is no substantial march yet against this tendency but there is widespread dissatisfaction. He said that all the average
American wants is an orange and a
few kind words. Every petty philosphy is explained; every vulgar passion is on the front page of the newspapers. The press is a business and is
there to make dividends and has no
sense of public obligation. The average
newspaper is a great money-making
corporation; it is organized for profit.
With the exception of half a dozen
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newspapers in the United States, it
will do anything to further these ends.
The present theory is that the individual is to be sacrificed for the ,ood
of the individual. The only argument
in favor of hanging is that when
hanged, the criminal cannot be pardoned.
He quoted BeTocqueville to
the effect that we live in a perfect atmosphere of self-applause.
Finally, Mr. Grant said that if the
time has come when the lawyer cannot say what he thinks in the presence
of lawyers and even judges, then there
was more to be said against the profession than he had discovered.
-A.

J. G.

James Kent
"As a judge and author, he will not
suffer when compared with the greatest names which have adorned the English law. Higher praise is not possible
to give. * * * Si-n.le as a child in his

tastes and habits throughout his tranquil and useful life; more than any
other judge the Creator of the equity
system of this Country; the author of
Commentaries which, in accuracy and
learning, in eloquence, purity and
vigor of style rival those of Sir William Blackstone. His name is admired,
his writings prized and his judgments
at law and in equity respected in every
quarter of the globe, nowhere more
than in England, where in its widening
conquest the English language of freedom has carried the English law."Jno. F. Dillon, "Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America", 379.

Gco. P. Metcalf on Lawyers: "Of all
the men on earth who cannot afford to
be dishonest, for the sake of humanity,
are lawyers, as in their hands rest the •
destinies of nations."
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The May Meeting

the Bar Association was held
HE regular monthly
meeting of
May 7, 1928, President Stearns
presiding.
The following applicants for membership were duly elected:
Milton Carlson
Glen L. Daly
Stanley H. Johnson
Benjamin B. Miller
Robert F. Palmer
Osmer Smith
Irving A. Sobol
J. Nelson Truitt
Merritt D. Vondy
Mr. Stearns announced that the annual Memorial Meeting of the Association would be held June 4, 1928, in
Division I of the District Court.
Mr. Kavanaugh on behalf of the Executive Committee then presented a
resolution adopted by that Committee,
recommending the holding of a Bar
Primary for the election of District,
County and Juvenile Court Judges at
the fall election, said Primary to be
conducted by the Judiciary Committee
and all details as to time, place and
method to be left to its discretion. Mr.
Kavanaugh moved its adoption. There
being no discussion, the resolution was
unanimously adopted.
President Stearns then introduced
Chief Justice John H. Denison of the
Supreme Court as the speaker of the
day. In doing so, Mr. Stearns stated
that forty-seven years ago, a boy from
Vermont arrived in Colorado and was
admitted to practice in 1881, and he
gained the confidence and regard of
the courts and his fellow lawyers, and
in .912, was elected to the District
Bench and later to the Supreme Court
Bench. Mr. Stearns said that no man
in the legal profession in Colorado was
more loved and respected than Judge
Denison. He stated that the Judge had

recently attended the Sixth Annual
Meeting of the Law Institute in Washington, upon which subject he would
speak.
Chief Justice Denison said:
"The American Law Institute is a
great institution. In all honesty I
must confess I know less about it than
I ought. Although I have been a member for years I have given it too little
attention, and only recently, when I
attended the annual meeting at Washington, have I become at all acquainted
with its methods and advantages. The
purpose, as you know, is to restate the
whole law; just to mention that fact
almost takes one's breath. The undertaking is a bold one, the proposition
is more than commendable, it is admirable, but the task is appalling. The
idea had been growing in the minds of
thoughtful lawyers for many years
while the study and administration of
the law were becoming cumbersome
and were approaching that degree of
cumbersomeness when they would be
impossible. Fifty years from now the
State House will hardly hold the Supreme Court library. Many able and
thoughtful jurists thought a restatement of the law might be made that
would abbreviate and clarify it, but
who was to do it? The task was too
great for any one man or any ten men;
it would require a small army. Lawyers could not afford to leave their
practice, and how could the incidental
expense be paid during the years it
would require to do the work. At this
stage the Rockefeller Foundation came
to the rescue, agreed to furnish the
necessary expense, and have done so
for the last six years. I do not know
the amount they have furnished annually, but it is very large.
The Institute is a voluntary association of lawyers, and is for the sole
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read, section by section, and all present are invited to suggest errors,
amendments and improvements. This
invitation is accepted very freely. The
reporter sitting beside the director and
president listens to all these suggestions, they are taken down in short
hand by highly experienced stenographers, for the use of the reporters in
preparing a new draft. With the help
of his advisers he then restates the
tentative statement, and it is again
submitted at the following annual
meeting. This goes on until he makes
The leaders of this movement have
a proposed final draft with his recomorganized and carried it forward on
mendation to the annual meeting for
this general plan: It is managed by
one- head called the director. At pres- its adoption as an official draft of the
Institute restatement of the subject
ent William Draper Lewis holds that
under his commission, thereupon it is
position, and maintains an office at
submitted to all the members of the
Philadelphia with sufficient number of
clerks and stenographers. He is con- Institute with the blank form as heretofore for criticisms and suggestion.
trolled by a board called the council.
At the next annual meeting this final
The restatement of each branch of
draft is read and discussed, section by
the law to be restated is under one
section, freely criticized and finally
man called a reporter, he is aided by
adopted. This goes out to the public
a number of others called his advisers.
as the statement of what the Institute
These advisers are widely scattered
thinks is the law of the subject under
throughout the United States, and thus consideration on the points of that subthe expression of view points geoject sought to be restated.
We, of
graphically variant is secured.
course, must not confuse this restatement with legislation. It has no govThe method of the formation of the
ernmental sanction. It has no analogy
restatement is thus; the reporter, in
to legislation and cannot in any way
correspondence
with the advisers,
affect it except by suggestion, which
makes a statement of what he believes
the law to be on part of his subject;. is the principal way in which it can
effect criminal procedure, since that is
for example contracts. It is printed
so commonly regulated by statutes
and copies sent to the members of
which are not subject to restatement
the Institute throughout the country.
With this copy is sent a blank form as are the principles and rules of the
common law. It is not the law because
for suggestions of errors, amendments
the Institute says so, but the Institute
or improvements which every member
says so because they believe it to be
is invited to offer. Upon receipt of
the law. In this respect it amounts to
these suggestions the reporter and his
the statements of law which you find
advisers accept or reject as they think
wise. This tentative draft is then con- in your text books, but because of the
character of the men who have made it
sidered by the council, a body of men
elected from the members of the Insti- and have considered and adopted it
tute, and when approved by them is
and because of the time and care that
taken before the Institute at its next
have been given to it, the probabilities
annual meeting. In this meeting it is
are that this restatement more nearly
purpose of making this restatement,
so greatly to be desired. It is composed by practitioners and instructors
of high standing and led by some of
the chief men of our profession. Many
of the members are highly distinguished; Elihu Root is Honorary President, Chief Justice Taft, John W.
Davis, William B. Greenough of Rhode
Island, George Wharton Pepper, Henry
W. Taft, Harlan F. Stone and Silas H.
Strawn are among the members who
attended the last meeting.
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accords with what the law is than any
text book, and is more reliable, affords
a more reliable answer to the question:
what is the law? upon any given
point, than the decision of any ordinary court. This work is done in the
hope that the law might thereby be
simplified and clarified, that is to say,
that it will furnish an easier and surer
way to determine what the law is than
any text book or recorded precedent.
What the effect of all this work will
be no one can foresee, but that it can
not be ignored by the courts even if
they wish is obvious. Counsel, searching for every possible support for the
legal proposition he lays before the
court, will surely cite that section
which he deems favorable, and thus it
will be brought before the courts of
every grade, from the Supreme Court
of the United States down. Several of
the Judges of the Supreme Court of
the United States are members of the
Institute and others are interested in
its success; their reception of its work,
then, will not be unfavorable. The
Chief Justices of the several states and
some of the Federal Judges, ex officio,
are members of the Institute and their
reception of it will not be hostile, but
the ultimate effect of this undertaking
can only be determined by time and
use, and will, of course, depend upon
the skill, accuracy and learning of its
composition; its power and virtues will
lie somewhere between those of a half
forgotten text book and those of established principles of elementary law.
The meetings of the Institute are
not without social features. Many of
the members bring ladies who are received as at a meeting of the American
Bar Association. On the night before
the first meeting of the Institute there
was a reception at the Mayflower Hotel, the official headquarters; on Friday, April 27th, there was a tea in
the afternoon, and a dinner Saturday
night after the last meeting.
Among the members present were
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two attractive young women, practitioners in Philadelphia. Mr. McCreery
and I were fortunate enough to be
assigned to the same table with them
at the dinner, and when I searched
out and found that table I found that
the handsomest member of the Denver
bar had, inadvertently no doubt, ensconced himself between them. The
gall of the man!
The Chief Justice of the United
States, though a member, does not
take part in the deliberations of the
Institute, but he honors every meeting
with a short address and this year he
did not omit it. Among other things,
he showed how well up with its work
the court was and that it was no longer
possible for a criminal, by, appeal, to
secure a period of rest and recreation
before taking up his duties as a compulsory employee of his country, and,
said the Chief Justice, "I wish to impress on certain members of the bar
that the constitution does not forbid
this expedition."
This, gentlemen, will give you a
fairly accurate, though meagre, account of the meeting upon which I was
asked to report. In conclusion I wish
to say that whatever your present
ideas are and whatever they may become, I think you all must agree with
me that the effort of the Institute is
a brave and wise one, and that some
good must and much good may come
from it."-A. J. G.

At the Recent Coal Strike
Hearings:
Q: Mr.
, I don't want
you to tell me what anybody else said,
or what you think, but I want to know
what you know of your own knowledge,
but I don't want any hearsay or anything that somebody told you,-are
you a married man?
A.

Yes, sir.
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Statutes of Limitations in California
By JACOR J. LiERIwix,

N

(This is the third of the series of articles written specially fur the Denver Bar
Association Record on comparisons between Colorado and California procedure and
certain aspects of the California laws which might be of interest to Denver lawyers.
These articles are being written by Mr. Lieberman, of the Los Angeles Bar, who was
formerly a member of the Denver Bar and Trustee of the Denver Bar Association.)

ties confronting the California
NE of the most frequent difficullawyer in the matter of claims
forwarded by Colorado Attorneys is
the handling of claims based upon
promissory notes which are more than
four years old. In view of the Statute
of Limitations of Colorado running six
years before barring most claims, including claims upon contracts and
promissory notes, a Colorado lawyer
naturally does not expect to be confronted with a Statute of Limitations
in California which bars such claims at
the end of four years.
The following are some of the limitations of actions in California:
1. An action upon a judgment or
decree of any Court of the United
States and an action for mesne profits
of real property are barred within five
years.
2. Actions upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing and actions to recover upon book accounts and actions
upon an account stated, and actions
for lalances due upon mutual open and
current accounts are barred within
four years.
3. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty
or forfeiture, and an action for trespass upon or injury to real property
and an action for taking, detaining or
injuring chattels including actions for
the specific recovery of personal property and an action for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake are barred
within three years.
4.

An action upon a contract, obli-

gation or liability not founded upon
an instrument of writing (other than
book accounts, accounts stated and
balances upon open accounts) is barred
within two years.
This is likewise
true of an action based upon a contract, obligation or liability evidenced
by a certificate or abstract or guaranty
of title of real property or by policy
of title insurance. An action against
a sheriff, coroner or constable upon a
liability arising out of an official act
or omission (excepting action for escape) is also barred within two years.
5. An action upon a statute for a
penalty or forfeiture is barred within
one year, except where the statute imposing the penalty prescribes another
limitation.
Also actions for libel,
slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction or for injury to or
for the death of one caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another or
by a depositor against a bank for the
payment of a forged or raised check,
are also barred within one year.
(Note that personal injury suits are
barred within one year.)
6. An action against an officer for
the recovery of property seized by the
officer in his official capacity as tax
collector or to recover the value of the
property so seized or for damages for
such seizure, detention or sale and actions to recover stock sold for delinquent assessments authorized by the
Corporation laws of the State of California, and actions to set aside or invalidate the act of a majority of the
trustees of a corporation which has
been dissolved by operation of law, In-
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cluding the revivor of any such Corporation, are barred within six months.
Actions or claims against a county
which have been rejected by the Board
of survivors must be commenced within six months after the first rejection
thereof by such board.
7. Actions to recover personal property left in a hotel are barred within
ninety days after the date of the departure of the owner of said personal
property from the hotel or lodging
house.
8. In the matter of actions for the
recovery of real property no action for
the recovery of real property can be
maintained unless it appear that the
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or
grantor was seized or possessed of the
property in question within five years
before the commencement of the action.
In actions for fraud, the time commences to run from the discovery of
the fraud, and in actions based upon
accounts consisting of more than one
item the statute begins running from
the time when the last item became
due.
The California Code of Civil Procedure provides that if, when the cause
of action accrues against a person, he
is out of the State, the action may be
commenced within the term limited
after return to the State, and if, after
the cause of action accrues, he departs
from the State, the time of his absence
is no part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action. Furthermore, if a person is entitled to bring
an action, but at the time the cause of
action accrued he is either a minor or
insane or imprisoned on a criminal
charge or is a married woman where
her husband is a necessary party with
her in commencing such action, the
time of such disability is not a part of
the time limited for the commencement
of the action and the statute of limitations is tolled during such period.
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If a person entitled to bring an action
dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof,
and the cause of action survive, an
action may be commenced by his representatives after the expiration of
that time and within six months from
his death. If a person against whom
an action may be brought dies before
the expiration of the time limited for
the commencement of such action, and
the cause of action survive, an action
may be commenced against his representatives after the expiration of that
time, and within one year after the
issuing of letters testamentary or of
administration.
No person can, of
course, avail himself of a disability
unless it existed when his right of action accrued.
An important and troublesome provision of the California Code of Civil
Procedure relating to limitations of
actions is that providing that no acknowledgment or promise is sufficient
evidence of a new or continuing contract, by which to take the case out of
the operation of the statutes of limitations, unless the same is contained in
some writing signed by the party to be
charged thereby. In other words, an
oral acknowledgment of indebtedness
is not sufficient. There must be a
written acknowledgment of the indebtedness or a written promise to pay in
order to toll the statute, and the written acknowledgment must at least imply a promise to pay. Part payient
alone is not a sufficient acknowledgment of the indebtedness which will
extend the time of limitation. The acknowledgment or implied or express
promise to pay must likewise be made
to the creditor himself or to someone
duly authorized to act for him in that
respect.
An acknowledgment to a
stranger is not sufficient.
When a
in another
try and by
an action

cause of action has arisen
State or In a foreign counthe laws of that jurisdiction
thereon cannot there bi
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maintained against a person by reason
of the lapse of time, an action thereon
cannot be maintained against him in
California except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of California and
who has held the cause of action from
the time it accrued. In other words,
if a cause of action is barred in an-
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other State, where the Statute of Limitations of that other State fixes a
shorter period of limitation than the
laws of California, the action is barred
in California unless the claim be held
by a citizen of California who has held
the claim or cause of action from the
time it accrued.

In Re Capper Resolution
March 12, 1928.
H. H. Wolff, Esq.
1515 E. 9th Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
My dear Mr. Wolff:
My friend, Carl Whitehead, handed
me a copy of the March issue of the
Denver Bar Association Record, containing an article in reply to Frazer
Arnold. I turn first to your debate
with Doctor Nicholas Murray Butler,
and find it most interesting because it
shows how utterly futile it is to try
to come to any agreement between two
men, one of whom would make so
many reservations in interpreting the
Capper resolution that its passage by
the Senate would mean nothing, and
the other, who is so fully committed
to the war system that he would not
entertain any proposal to avoid war
which, in his estimation, would affect
the "honor, the safety and the welfare
of his country." I wish to congratulate
you on the completeness of your reply
to Doctor Butler. In my judgment,
the reason you have not heard from
him in answer to your letter is because there is no reply to make. He
tries to defend the Capper Resolution
by reading into it something that is
not there, and you point this out conclusively.
Of course, Mr.
cede that under
there can never
which will "lead

Wolff, you must conyour defense of war
be a proposal made
us forward", to use

your expression. The only way out
of war is to renounce it as an instrument of national policy, to outlaw it.
This is Briand's proposal, and the reason why Secretary Kellogg did not answer this proposal with equal frankness is because America is not yet
ready "to renounce war as an instrument of national policy" It is perfectly clear that the causes of war can
never be removed. Nations, as with
men, will always fall out, dispute and
quarrel, but if war is ever to be abolished these nations must agree, as
with men, that they will never go to
war about their difficulties. Gun-play
between men, either in the defense of
property or in its acquisition, has been
outlawed.
Between nations force is
still honored, respected and made perfectly legal under national law.
There are two types of men opposed
to the Capper Resolution, one whom
Admiral Plunkett well represented in
his late declaration that "the penalty
of national efficiency, either in commerce or in arms, is war." "If I read
history aright," he says, "we are nearer war today than ever before, because
we are pursuing a competitive trade
policy and crowding other nations into
the background. A policy of this kind
inevitably leads to war." I recently
rode from Denver to Colorado Springs
with a former Colorado banker who
defends Admiral Plunkett's position
absolutely. This is the policy of the
United Fruit Company, whose manager

THE

DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

told me some years ago that if Costa
Rico should impose what they regarded was an excess export tax on bananas they would call on Uncle Sam
to maintain their position. If an administration can be elected in harmony
with this idea the United States will
embark upon a career which will make
us "respected" the world over. I am
sure you know I am not over-stating
this position. It is held by the Chicago Tribune, a journal of large influence, and is the opinion of millions of
our citizens.
The other type of man opposed to
the Capper Resolution is largely a sentimentalist in his peace policy. He
hears Doctor Shotwell, or Miss Maude
Royden, or Doctor Butler, and he is
thrilled with the idea of world peace,
and these addresses are to be commended for they keep the subject of
peace constantly before the people.
But this idealism is largely ineffectual,
except for educational purposes, and
in his pious opinions about peace he
is apt to be self-deceived. He wants
to get rid of war by "tapering off". In
peace times he waves the olive branch
but when war clouds thicken he has
little difficulty in convincing himself
"that the welfare of his nation demands that war be made." He does
not sit quietly down, as you have done,
and count the cost which must be paid
by the American people if war is to
be abolished.
I know what you will reply to this
letter. It will be about as follows:
"This man Sweet is utterly lacking in
patriotism. He is a pacifist and as
suph should be handed over to the
tender mercies of the American Legion," or: "Sweet believes in a little
No, Mr. Wolff, I believe
nation."
America can cover the sea with her
commerce, and loan money to every
nation that has the security to offer,
and be, in the best sense.of the word,
a great nation. I believe that America, without the slightest risk to her
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honor and future welfare, can decide
now what she would do whenever any
question which might lead to war
arises. I stand foursquare on the Capper Resolution with all the implications which you point out.
Your position can never rid the
world of war, and as long as you hold
to the force doctrine it is idle for you,
and men who think as you do, to consider the abolishment of war. On the
contrary, you must admit that the
plan of outlawry, as proposed by
France, will rid the world of war.
You, however, are not willing to pay
the price in so-called national honor
and future welfare. We have been
working under your hypothesis since
the beginning of civilization and with
no great success. It is only since the
world war that outlawry has been discus sed. The idea is growing rapidly,
both at home and in Europe, as is indicated by Senator Capper's Resolution
But
in reply to Briand's proposal.
America. growing richer and more
powerful every day, will not accept this
idea, in my opinion, in this generaYours very truly,
(Signed) Wm. E. SwF=r.
March 12, 1928.
H. H. Wolff, Esq.
1515 E. 9th Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
My dear Mr. Wolff:
Your illustration of the Monroe
Doctrine, in your reply to Doctor Butler, expresses exactly what Doctor
Butler means when he said that "In
the United States the Monroe Doctrine
has been expressed in so many different forms that no one can be sure as
to what it really means." If you will
carefully read President Monroe's message you will see that he was concerned primarily with the safety and
preservation of the political institutions of the new Republics which had
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just recently been established after
throwing off the Spanish yoke. He
refers explicitly to the fact that "Spain
can never subdue them" and says, "It
is still the policy of the United States
to leave the parties to themselves with
the hope that other powers will pursue
the same course." President Monroe
did not proclaim this doctrine to make
sure that our "national security should
not be jeopardized", much writing and
oratory to the contrary notwithstanding.
President Monroe was peculiarly interested in perpetuating democratic
institutions which had found root in
the Western Hemisphere, and he
warned the allied powers against trying to overthrow them. His reference
to the extension of "their system to
any portion of this Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" refers
to the political institutions of the
United States and not to its territory.
I ask you, since when has any
European power sought to destroy
democratic and republican institutions,
either in the United States or anywhere in this Western Hemisphere?
What is more, these same powers have
in recent years become more and more
democratic. One may stand by the
Monroe Doctrine as initiated by President Monroe, but be opposed to the
Cleveland, Lodge, Roosevelt, Coolidge
view of it.
Your reference to the challenging of
the Monroe Doctrine by one of five nations "through the colonization of a
large tract of land with a good harbor
in a neighboring country close to our
border", sounds like a Hearst editorial. This fact, if true, is no more challenging to the Monroe Doctrine than
the recent visit of a group of Japanese
statesmen to the United States, or the
visit of Lord Robert Cecil and Ramsay
MacDonald, of England.
Some day this doctrine, which, because of evolutionary processes of his-
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tory has long since outlived its usefulness but has become the pretext for
much American jingoism, will be formally repealed or discarded by the
United States in the interests of harmony and good will among the Latin
American Republics.
The so-called
violation of the Monroe Doctrine has
been the means of perpetrating a vast
amount of political bunk upon the
American people, largely for personal
purposes.
Yours very truly,
(Signed)

Wm. E. SWVET.

April 7, 192S.
Hon. William E. Sweet,
U. S. National Bank Building,
Denver, Colorado.
My dear Governor Sweet:
Your two valued letters of March
12th concerning my correspondence
with Dr. Butler about the Capper resolution should have had earlier reply
but for a somewhat extensive business
trip from which I have recently returned.
Referring to your assumption that
my answer would be disparaging to
you personally, please be assured that
I rate such discourtesy most reprehensible and as an argument self-destructive.
You make a number of statements
which you do not offer to support with
reasons. I know that with many people assertions are very effective. Thus
Voliva, of Zion City fame, asserts and
reasserts that the earth is flat and he
has many followers. But it can hardly
be called argument. As for Secretary
Kellogg, he does not need me to defend
him but it may well be that his reasons are other than you so definitely
assume. I do not concede that the
future may not reveal some acceptable
method of avoiding war because I am
no seer and can not read the future.
I do not accept your assertion that
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"the only way out of war is to renounce it as an instrument of national
policy, to outlaw it," because you attempt no proof that it is the only way
nor, indeed, that it is a way at all and
I do not admit, as you demand of me,
that the plan proposed will rid the
world of war because, on the contrary,
I intend to prove not alone that it can
not do so but that it will make matters
worse.
Quoting Webster's dictionary: "To
renounce is to make an affirmative declaration of abandonment."
The Founder of our Christian civilization did not renounce force but on
the contrary employed it aggressively
in a righteous cause when He cleared
the temple with the lash. It can not,
therefore, in itself be wrong.
It is impossible for anyone fit to
be called human even to conceive of
abandoning force in defending himself,
his family, his home unless these are
defended by outside force. I challenge
you to say that you have done so.
Unless you can truthfully say that you
will let a criminal tear your wife or
daughter from your side and that you
will not use force to protect her, to the
point of killing if need be, you have
not "renounced force as an instrument
of policy".
Nations are but men collectively and
it is impossible for a group to think
that which the individuals composing
the group do not and can not think.
If individuals can not think without
a background of force when needed,
then collections of these individuals
can not do so and a proposal based upon an impossibility is of course impossible. Nothing further is needed
to show the utter futility and absurdity of the whole scheme.
But let us analyze a little further.
You say that nations must agree never
to go to war. I say that they must do
incomparably more than that. They
must keep the agreement. I can cite
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you broken agreements where big issues were involved from the days of
the Greek gift-horse to the Trojans
down to the tri-partite "scrap of paper" which guaranteed the integrity
of Belgium. What have you to offer
in the way of agreements kept?
You say "nations must agree, as with
men, that they will never go to war
about their difficulties."
Men customarily make written contracts which
would correspond to the treaties
which you favor. To this extent your
analogy holds. But behind these contracts are the courts, and behind the
courts are the police, and behind the
police is the militia, and behind the
militia is the regular army of the
United States. What do you propose
to put behind your treaties? Nothing
of the kind is proposed in the Capper
resolution.
If, then, there is no outside protection and we in good faith should abide
by the agreement, what in your opinion would happen if the other party
to the agreement should break it and
attack as has been done so consistently
since the dawn of civilization until
fourteen years ago? Or do you assume
that human nature has changed completely in these fourteen years and
upon such a preposterous assumption
ask us to gamble away our safety and
prosperity?
By your own statement the causes of
war can not be removed. Yet without
removing the causes you expect to prevent the effects of those causes, and
you believe it possible to do this with
a formula of words.
I have often heard men say that
wars are due to the stupidity of statesmen. Yet these same men would put
these same statesmen about a table
and by combining their stupidities
make wisdom. I apologize for thus
paraphrasing the words of a great
philosopher, even though this philosopher lived only in fiction.
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All of the foregoing and all that
follows is based on the assumption that
the Capper resolution means just what
it says, that war, all war, is to be
renounced, and that there is to be substituted for resistance by force, actual
or implied, the gentler method of negotiation and conciliation, with arbitration as the last resort, be the demands just or unjust, and of whatever nature and without exception. Dr.
Butler denies this but you accept my
statement and say: "I stand foursquare
on the Capper resolution with all the
implications which you point out."
The examples which I chose in my letter to Dr. Butler and to which you referred in the sentence just quoted concerned the debt settlements, our tariff,
the Monroe Doctrine, prohibition, our
immigration laws. You agree that any
or all of these questions may come up
for arbitration. They are all political,
not judicial, and are of the general
type of questions that bring on war.
We are not concerned with questions
that do not bring on war. If, then, we
intend to avert war by arbitration
when we can not come to agreement by
direct negotiation, it follows that the
arbitrator must have full power and
authority to decide.
I can understand that people may
differ on the tariff, on prohibition, and
on the other questions, but I can not
understand any one who would wish
these matters left to foreign determination.
If this were to be done it
would mean nothing less than foreign
control of the domestic affairs of this
country, for all of these essential
questions would be "arbitrated" as effectively as they are now legislated by
the Congress.
And under your bypothesis we would have no recourse.
How could an arbitrator be selected?
To name the question and the arbitrator would be practically equivalent
to naming the decision. In the immigration question, if Great Britain or
any of her colonies were chosen the
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decision would be in our favor because
their interests parallel ours. If Italy,
Japan,
Germany,
Poland,
Austria,
Jugo-Slavia, or any one of the Balkan
countries were picked, the decision
would be against us. On the tariff I
believe Canada and Australia would
be with us, but woe betide us if ever
one of the big industrial nations of
the world could dictate!
With our
wealth the greatest prize the world
has ever seen, how long would it be
before all those countries would have
a quiet little understanding among
themselves on how best to pick our
feathers?
I have tried to establish, and I trust
success~ully : First, that all schemes based upon
a voluntary and continued abandonment of force are impossible because
based upon an inherent fallacy.
Secondly, that all schemes based upon the voiuntary and continued good
faith of the parties to an agreement
are predestined to fail because there
is nothing in history or in nature upon which to base a reasonable hope
that such agreements will be kept.
Thirdly, that any scheme unde-"
which we place ourselves, our territory, our institutions, our wealth, our
home markets, our domestic laws, any
of which in any way are a temptation
to foreign nations, at the mercy of
such foreign nations will most certainly prove disastrous to us, for we have
everything to lose and nothing to gain.
Fourthly, that even if we were willing to take such desperate chances under the guise of arbitration, it would
be almost inypossible to agree upon an
arbitrator.
I wish now to add, as a fifth proposition which is in a sense a corollary to
the other four, that the consequences
of the inevitable failure of the Capper scheme must be to aggravate antagonisms and to create new causes of
friction and dispute between nations,
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that thereby the likelihood and frequency of war would be much increased and that herein lies one of the
most serious objections to all schemes
of this kind. For each nation believing itself honest and fair and its opponents treacherous and dishonest,
often with no cause other than a different point of view, may easily become inflamed, stubborn and uncontrollable by its leaders. We have seen
this amply demonstrated in the aftermath of the world war, when the panacea of the League of Nations raised the
hopes of peoples to the heights of ecstasy only to have failure dash them
into the trough of despair from which
they are but now emerging into the
realm of common sense. For Fiume
could not be given to both Italy and
the Slavs, nor a Polish corridor to the
sea established without dividing Germany, nor Shantung be bestowed upon
both China and Japan, and justice as
seen by each of these pairs of nations
required that all of these be done.
It is unfair, untrue and unjust to
intimate that I, and such as I, favor
or defend war as an end in itself because I say that up to this time no
practicable plan has been proposed to
prevent it and that the one we are
discussing will tend rather to cause
than to avert it. As well accuse me
of arson because I would prevent you
from throwing gasoline on a fire to
extinguish the flames.
Like every other sane man I dread
war, its cruelty and destruction and I
would continue and extend those legitimate thoughts, principles and deeds
which will relegate it more and more
into the background. Such are international courtesies and good manners,
fair play and a willingness to see from
the other nation's point of view, concession even to the point of generosity,
and as great a contact and intermingling of the various nationals as
possible for their better acquaintance
and understanding. But I would not,
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for the disease of war, attempt any
patent medicine cure-all nor risk a
preparation that may be only poison.
I said that it is unfair to accuse me
of favoring war as such, but you may
truly charge me with believing that
war is often the lesser of two evils
and should then rightly be waged. Do
you or do you not agree with me in
this? If you ao, then all differences
between us on this score are but differences of degree as exist between all
men and each instance may find either
of us on either side, for very possibly
you might favor a war that I should
utterly condemn. But if, on the other
hand, you insist that war is always
wrong, that it must always be avoided,
at any price and whatever the consequences, then indeed we differ hopelessly in principle, for you would see
your country invaded and not resist,
you would see women raped and
children slaughtered and not fight, you
would fatuously seek peace where there
is no peace. And if ever the larger
portion of our male citizens should
come to be of this mind, whether
through self-righteousness or through
laziness, cowardice, self-indulgence and
the other evils of luxury, or through
the increasingly strong movement to
effeminize the manhood of the nation,
then indeed it is as inevitable as that
night shall follow the day that, unless
our women rise up to protect us, our
beloved nation must succumb even as
great Rome fell from the same causes
and false philosophies, philosophies as
old as history itself, with the same
recurrent results, that each new set
of "idealists" and "serious thinkers"
resurrects from the ash heap as something beautiful and new.
There remains but to reply to your
discourse on the Monroe Doctrine. I
wonder by what course of deduction
you arrive at the conclusion that Monroe's concern was primiarily for the
maintenance of the new form of government in the Latin American re-
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publics as an ideal, rather than for
the safeguarding of our own institutions by the protection of the outposts,
in the face of these statements in the
message: ". .. the occasion has been
judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests
of the United States are involved, that
the American continents ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects
for future colonization by any European powers." "... to declare that we
should consider any attempt on their
part to extend their system to any
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." "..... we
could not view any interposition .. .in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." "It is impossible that the allied powers should
extend their political system to any
portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness."
Nor do I understand your distinction
between our institutions and our territory since we wish to maintain both.
But all of the above is more or less
of academic interest only and has little bearing on the question at issue,
the Capper resolution. I used the term
Monroe Doctrine in its generally accepted present day sense and more especially in that part of its meaning
which prohibits, under penalty of war,
the acquisition of American territory
by a non-American power.
Your question "since when has any
European power sought to destroy
democratic and republican institutions
either in the United States or anywhere in this Western Hemisphere"
pays a splendid and well deserved tribute, quite unintentional on your part,
to the efficacy of threatened force in
preventing war and bloodshed, for it
was under this, the most far-reaching
and sustained threat of war perhaps
ever pronounced by man, that this
Hemisphere has had one hundred years
of the almost complete immunity from
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attack which you point out. The exeption, which I give you in answer
to your question, occurred(l during our
one period of weakness when we were
engaged in protecting the Union from
the attacks of the disruptionists of that
day, when all the outside world knew
that we could not at the time employ
"war as an instrument of policy".
Then, indeed, did our historic friends,
the nation of Lafayette and of Briand,
take immediate advantage of our weakness, send her troops across the sea,
seize the land of our neighbor, and
place the Austrian Maximilian upon
the throne of empire. Hardly had our
Civil War ended, however, when upon
our demand and under threat of the
most powerful army then in existence,
the French troops were withdrawn and
the Mexican empire collapsed.
It will require a va~t amount of
sound argument, I trust, to convince
the American people that this Doctrine
which has helped so enormously to preserve the peace on this continent, as
your question clearly brings out, that
this tried and trusted cornerstone of
our foreign policy should ever be abandoned.
I have, to the best of my ability,
stated my position clearly on every issue in your letters, answered every
question, expressed or implied, specifically and without evasion, and reasoned the logic of the situation, coming to the conclusion that the present
proposal is theoretically impossible of
success and in practice would make a
bad situation worse. I have done this
at your instance and I trust that you
will favor me similarly, to the end that
we may lay before such of the American public as we may be able to reach,
clear and succinct reasons for and
against this most important proposal.
I have confined myself to fact and argument, and have avoided generalities
which please the ear and the heart but
mean no more than the usual panegyrics on the unquestioned beauties of
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everlasting peace or emotional appeals
to risk everything on a gamble that
shall bring us the millenium as the
prize. We have both heard too many
high pressure salesmen to be impressed
by promises unsupported with facts
and, alas! we have both seen too many
lifetime savings, that should have
maintained moderate comfort and ease,
thrown away to the siren song of luxury and wealth only to bring misery
and despair.
I, for one, am well satisfied with my
small holding of plain looking but safe
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and time tested securities of that great
corporation called the United States of
America and shall not willingly trade
them for the honey worded, azure tinted, red sealed certificates of Utopia.
May your closing sentence prove prophetic, that "America, growing richer
and more powerful every day, will not
accept this idea . . . in this generation"!
With cordial regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) H. H. WOIFF.

Colorado Supreme Court Decisions
Editor's Note-It is intended in each
issue of the Record to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the Supreme
Court.
These abstracts will be printed
only after the time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or
in the event that a petition for rehearing
has been filed the abstract will be printed
only after the petition has been disposed

of).
No. 12052
Public Utilities Commission, et al, vs.
The People of the State of Colorado,
on the relation of J. R. Hantrock.
Decided April 9, 1928
En Banc
Civil Service-Discretion of Public
Utilities Commission-Mandamus
Facts-S. L. 1927, Ch. 134 empowered the Public Utilities Commission
to appoint and employ inspectors and
a salary for two inspectors was apI)ropriated.
The Civil Service Commission certified a list of those eligible for appointment, H. being first and
one Dillon, second. Dillon only was
appointed and H. brought mandamus
to compel the Public Utilities Coinmission to appoint him.

Held-This position is that of employe only, not an office; therefore
mandamus is the proper remedy.

No. 12060
Morris Schtul, versus Al.

A. Wilson.

Decided April 9, 1928.
Appeal and Error-Deceit-Evidence
Facts-Plaintiff
alleged defendant
induced him to accept the note of one
Bentley in payment of a purchase by
defendant, by misrepresenting Bentley's solvency.
Summons demanded
damages for fraudulently pretending
that Bentley's note was good and the
maker financially able to pay it. Judgment for plaintiff and findings of
fraud, malice and wilful deceit.
Hcld-(1) Evidence shows Bentley
did not own the property which defendant represented he did and on
which plaintiff relied.
This is prima
facie proof of insolvency, without evidence of absence of other property.
(2) Plaintiff was not bound to investigate Bentley's solvency. Defendant's instruction to the contrary properly refused.
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No. 11,819
Olney Springs Drainage District, et al,
vs. William Auckland.
Decided April 2, 1928
Waters-Water Courses
Facts-Auckland brought a c t i o n
against Olney Springs Drainage District and Pantle, a ditch contractor, to
enjoin them from diverting the water
collected in the drainage system of
the district, away from its outlet
above plaintiff's land on which he used
it for irrigation, and from changing its
course into a new channel away from
such lands and so depriving plaintiff
of the use of such waters.
Findings were for plaintiff and permanent injunction issued against the
defendant.
Held-1. Drainage water flowing
from the drainage system of a district
is subject to appropriation in the same
manner as other waters of the State
are subject to appropriation.
2. Plaintiff was not a trespasser in
constructing a conduit from the drainage canal on the district's right of
way, to carry the water over and upon
plaintiff's land for irrigation, where
the purpose of the construction thereof was to abate nuisance.
No. 11,843
Frank L. Miller, v. The East Denver
Municipal Irrigation District, a public corporation.
Dept. 1
Contempt-Dismissal-Jurisdiction
Facts-In 1913 the District started
suit and obtained an order for possession of a right of way over M.'s land.
In 1914 the District moved that the
cause be dismissed on certain terms.
In 1920 the Court entered an order dismissing the case, but without giving
notice to the District. In 1925 the order of dismissal was vacated and the
case reinstated. M. contended that
the court was without jurisdiction to
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reinstate this cause, and was fined for
contempt upon refusing to obey the
order for possession.
Held-The order of dismissal was
made without notice to the District
and was therefore void. The court
retained jurisdiction of the cause, and
M.'s failure to obey its order was contempt.
No. 11869
The Poudre River Oil Corporation,
versus Carey.
Decided March 19, 1928
Oil-Lien Pleading-Practice
Facts-C. brought suit for services
in drilling an oil well and to foreclose a lien for that amount which he
had filed upon certain personal property belonging to Oil Company.
Held-1.
The parties in Lower
Court treating a matter as an issue,
the omission of the specific allegation
from the complaint cannot be raised
for the first time in the Supreme
Court.
2. Defaults of Oil Company entitled
C. to abandon work.
3. Sections 6466 and 6467 Compiled
Laws of Colorado, 1921 does not give a
lien upon machinery and equipment,
used in connection with oil well where
C. only performed the labor and did
not furnish the material. One furnishing labor only is limited in his lien
to the well itself and the fee or leasehold interest. As to whether or not
the labor lien statute might attach to
machinery and equipment treated as a
part of the oil well itself and not as
severable personal property, not decided.
No. 11,894
Edna Whitaker Thayer, etc. vs. Francis J. Kirchof. etc.
Decided April 2, 1928
En Banc
Master and Servant-Respondeat
Superior Independent Contractor
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Facts-K. had the general contract
for erecting a building. He made an
arrangement whereby one Myers was
to haul the dirt from the excavation
for the building. Myers did not have
enough teams of his own and one
Delashmutt agreed to furnish some
men and teams and sent one Stevens
to do hauling, in the course of which
W. was injured by Stevens.
Held-K. is not liable. Stevens was
working for either Delashmutt or
Myers and was doing their work, not
K.'s.
No. 11,913
City and County of Denver, a Municipal Corporation, versus The Bargan
Land and Investment Company, a
Corporation.
Decided April 23, 1928
Mnnicipal Corporations-Widening
Strets-Ordinance
Facts-City and County of Denver
sought to widen and straighten the
jog in East Twelfth Avenue between
Grant and Logan Streets, Denver. The
work involved cutting off a strip of
the curb, parking lawn and the sidewalk.
Plaintiff, adjoining property
owner, secured an injunction against
the City.
Held-1. Failure to publish map accompanying and referred to In ordinance itself was published as required
by law, where map itself is on file,
does not void ordinance.
2. Delegation of authority with reference to minor matters in connection
with public improvements to the proper officer does not void ordinance.
3. In determining what changes and
improvements in a street will render
the street more useful for a highway,
the municipality has a large discretion, and courts will interfere only
when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily
or oppressively.
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No. 11,924
The First National Bank of Aurora,
Colorado, et al versus Edward J.
Mulich.
Decided April 2, 1928
Facts-The Action was by Edward
J. Mulich, hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff, against the bank to recover
about One Thousand Dollars left on
deposit by his deceased sister. Plaintiff's sister was a patient in Fitzsimmons hospital. She had in her own
name a checking account in Defendant
She executed to Defendant
bank.
Bank the following:
January 5, 1925 The First National
Bank, Aurora, Colorado. Gentlemen:
I hereby request that my checking account be made joint with my brother
Edw. J. Mulich for him to check on
only in case of my death. Yours truly,
Sister died.
ISABEL E. MULICH.
Judgment below for plaintiff.
Held-1. Prior determination in
County Court is not res adjudicata because no judgment of the County Court
appears in the record. Mere findings
and memoranda are not a judgment
and do not constitute a record thereof.
2. There was a good gift inter vivos
between sister and brother. Also title
to money was in plaintiff for another
reason i. e. letter of sister to bank
amounts to a draft, payable at a future
time, upon a contingency, and its retention by the bank was an acceptance
constituting an agreement to pay the
whole balance, if any, after the drawer's death, to the plaintiff.
No. 11951
John H. Gabriel, versus The Board of
Regents of the University of Colorado, a Body Corporate.
Decided: April 30, 1928
Declaratory Judgments Act-Moot
Questions
Facts-Suit was brought in court
below by Clifford W. Mills under de-

THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
claratory judgments act, to determine
the validity of a contract. Defendant
demurred to the complaint on the
grounds of insufficient facts and want
of jurisdiction. Demurrer sustained
below.
judgments act
Held-Declaratory
provides that: "Any person interested
under a * * * written contract * * *
may have determined any question
of construction or validity arising under the instrument, * * *."
Complaint fails to state that such
question of construction or validity of
contract has arisen. Mere fear that
such question may arise in the future
insufficient. This act was not intended to repeal the statute prohibiting
judges from giving legal advice, nor to
impose the duties of the profession
upon the courts, nor to provide advance judgments as the basis of commercial enterprises, nor to settle mere
academical questions.
No. 11,980
Auguste Nicolas, versus Caroline I.
Grassle, et al.
Decided April 16, 1928.
Highway-Obstruction-Injunction
Facts-Nicolas brought suit against
Grassle et al., to enjoin the obstruction of a road which he claimed was
a public highway.
Injunction denied by Lower Court.
Held-Congress has enacted that
"The right of way for the construction
of highways over public lands not reserved for public use is hereby granted." The word, "construction" as used
in Federal Statute, does not require
that work must be done on highway.
Any use of highway over public land,
however slight, and though it gives access only to one property owner,.constitutes a highway. Federal Statute
was an express dedication and the use
by those for whom it was necessary
was an acceptance.
Reserved:
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No. 12,061
D. L. Coursey, vs. The Industrial Commission of Colorado.
Decided April 2, 1928
Dept. One
Industrial Commission-Review of
Award
Facts-On April 28, 1926, C. was
awarded compensation for injuries. On
May 12, 1926 the referee set aside this
award without notice to C. Upon review by the District Court, the dismissal was set aside and the original
award was adjudged to be in full force.
The Commission then ordered further
hearings, of which C. had full notice,
and further compensation was denied.
Held-Under C. L. '21, 4484, the
Commission may order hearings diminishing, maintaining or increasing the
compensation previously awarded, even
though the original award has been
affirmed by the District Court, because
such affirmance adds nothing to the
award.
Affirmed.

Recent Trial Court
Decisions
Of General Interest
(Editor's Note.-It is intended in each
issue of the Record to note interesting
current decisions of all local Trial Courts,
including the United States District Court,
State District Courts, the County Court,
and the Justice Courts. The co-operation
of the members of the Bar Is solicited in
making this department a success. Any
attorney having knowledge of such a decision is requested to phone or mail the
title of the case to Victor Arthur Miller,
who will digest the decisions for this department. The names of the Courts having no material for the current month will
be omitted, due to lack of space.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DIvISION VI.

No. 29570
The People of the State of Colorado vs.
C. C. Bennett, et al.
Order.
The Court. In this matter, case No.
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29570, The People of the State of Colorado versus C. C. Bennett, et al., in
view of certain publications in the
public press the Court deems it proper
to make a statement at this time as it
would appear to the court from the
various publications which the court
has read and now has before the court
that if this sort of comment is to continue in this case it is going to interfere with the due administration of
justice.
These articles in a general way purport to forecast what motions are going to be filed, and what attacks are
going to be made, and proceeds to say
whether certain compensation that the
court has ordered should be paid or
not, and interviews different ones as
to the policy of obeying the court's
orders, all of which if continued is
calculated to, and tends to obstruct
the courts in the administration of the
business before the court. Such action
cannot but help, if continued, in prejudicing the people either for or against
the defendants, and endangering the
people's case or prejudicing the defendants' case.
The court of its own motion, and
own suggestion, is making these remarks and comments at this time that
all may take notice, and that the attorneys both for the People and the
defendants may take notice and govern themselves accordingly.
Second. The court calls attention to
the case of Massie v. People, 258 Pacific Reporter, p. 226, a decision of our
Supreme Court, and especially on page
231 of the opinion, in which the court
comments on this kind of interference
which practically poisons the mind of
a community for either one or the
other and makes it impossible to have
a fair and impartial trial according to
law.
The court says:
"These newspaper articles appeared between March 3 and
March 25. They formed a part of

the basis for a change of venue,
and the trial did not begin until
six weeks later. Defendant was
entitled to have them stopped by
a collateral proceeding against the
newspapers, the record discloses
none; he was entitled to call the
prosecutor to account if he was
responsible for them, no attempt
to do so was made. In their brief
counsel for defendant says:
"All the jurors who raised their
right hands and swore to a 'true
verdict render' were so convinced
of the guilt of the defendant long
before a syllable of testimony ever
fell from the mouth of the first
witness that argument, logic, reason, even evidence itself, were
alike without avail to sway them
from the preconceived belief of
the guilt of the defendant."
"This is indeed a dark picture,
but the brush which painted it was
dipped in colors obtained elsewhere than in this record. If any
question was asked of a juror on
this subject, if any had read these
articles or were prejudiced there.
by, if any was excluded from service therefor, we are not apprised
of it. The record is silent on the
subject.
"So numerous, however, have
been similar complaints in this
jurisdiction in the past, and in
some instances apparently so well
founded, we cannot, before leaving this branch of the case, refrain from calling the attention
of officers and newspapers in the
cases of Ex parte Sturm et al.,
and Ex parte Burns, both tried before Judge Eugene O'Dunne, of
the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City, sitting in the criminal division. The Sturm case is reported
in 136 A. 312, and was published
in the Daily Record, Baltimore,
January 24, 1927. The Burns case
was published in the last mentioned periodical January 5, 1927.
Both appear in the February Journal of the American Judicature
The opinion in these
Society.
cases sets forth some of the principles which should guide public
officials and the public press in
dealing with pending litigation, review the history of the subject,
and cite the greatest and soundest
authorities. They have received
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nation-wide notice and almost universal approval. We recommend
to those interested their careful
perusal. Reversible error in cases
of great public importance, new
trials with their attendant difficulties and often enormous expense,
and unpleasant and unnecessary
litigation involving officers and
newspapers having no desire to
transgress the law or embarrass
its administration, may thus be
avoided."
The court is not particularly disturbed at what has happened up to this
date, but it is an old saying "That
coming events cast their shadows before," and the court regards it as a
very significant shadow that these
articles have been, and are being published from day to day.
The court does not intend to in any
way hamper the public press in publishing proper news, and the courts
are public, and what takes place in
open court is public unless otherwise
ordered by the court.
The court sees no reason to think
there will be any necessity of suppressing the news of anything that
takes place in court, although the
court is of the opinion that the court
in a proper case has that power, but it
does propose to use what authority
the court has in preventing the taking
up of moot questions that are liable
to come before the court at some time,
and using the influence of the press to
either carry out a certain policy, or
prevent something from being carried
out. That is commonly called trying
a case in the newspapers. That is
what the court intends to stop in the
future in this case.
Third.
The court particularly enjoins upon the District Attorney and
the Special Prosecutors the duty of
properly calling to the attention of the
court any infringement, in this regard
in the future as against the law as laid
down by our Supreme Court in the
Massie case; and the court equally en-
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joins and asks the attorneys for the
defendants likewise to likewise formally call the court's attention to any
wilful infringement of the rights of the
defendants according to the law of
that case, and the court particularly
enjoins the attorneys on both sides of
this case not to give out to any of the
newspapers matters that they expect
to file or bring before the court so that
it would be taken up and argued
through the newspapers before it ever
reaches the court. If any newspaper,
or any person or persons, does anything tending to violate the law as laid
down in the Massie case, the court desires they be formally informed
against collaterally so that they may
be dealt with for contempt of court.
The court does not intend, and does
not want these remarks to be construed, as intending on the part of
the court to go into the past, or as to
what has been said or published concerning this case by any newspaper,
but from this time on if there is any
action that is taken contrary to the
law and decisions of our Supreme
Court, the court will consider it when
properly brought to the attention of
the court by the attorneys upon either
side, and will to the best of its ability
enforce the law as laid down by our
Supreme Court.
The court hopes that this warning
and caution will be sufficient, but the
court thinks that it was its duty at
this time to issue the warning so that
this case, like other cases, may be
tried and decided in a judicial way,
and not be interfered with by these
charges and counter-charges such as
have been published.
Done in open court this 7th day of
April, A. D., 1928.
By the Court.
GEO. F. DUNKLEE
Judge.
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good Client
MEMBERS of the Bar acting as attorneys

for estates in cases where a bank is executor or administrator find a financial institution to be a good client.
The bank's officers are experienced, understand the business in hand, are always available and appreciate the importance of legal
service. Matters of accounting, colledions,
and other business details of which counsel
are glad to be relieved are attended to by
the bank. The combination of a good lawyer and an experienced trust department
produces the best possible administration.
At each of the undersigned banks it is an
established policy that the attorney who
draws the will designating the bank in a
fiduciary capacity shall be chosen as attorney for the estate.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
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